பாதுகாப்பு மேலாண்மை இதழ்
திறந்த அணுகல்

சுருக்கம்

Turning Korea Around: An Analysis of Mission Command at Chipyong-Ni

Jamie l Hickman*

The Korean war, famously euphemized by president Truman as a “police action,” was a near-miss military endeavor for America and the allied forces characterized by international threat, high body counts and unexpected reversals on the battlefield. Military strategy in Korea began with the failed task force smith at Suwon, a movement gen Douglas MacArthur later admitted being an “arrogant display of strength.” Indeed, although Americans had been conditioned by Wii to mount large-scale combat to complete victory, the Truman administration had made significant cuts to defense spending and it was clear early on that the situation in Korea required a new strategy. The U.S. lost 6,000 soldiers in the first few months of the war; south Korean casualties neared 70,000. By September 1950, the tide had changed and American military action, driven mainly by amphibious attack, had succeeded in the steady seizure of Suwon via inch ‘on, resulting in the recapture of Seoul. But not more than two months later an “entirely new war” had emerged with the influx of more than 300,000 Chinese combat troops to aid Kim ill sung and the soviet forces in north Korea. It was a bitter winter for the allies in Korea. Were it not for the exemplary leadership at the battle of chipyong-ni in mid-February 1951, the communist Chinese forces (CCF) would have continued their strong drive into south Korea and the war may well have been lost. Col Paul freeman, commander of the 23rd regimental combat team (RCT), clearly met gen George c. Marshall’s definition of strong leadership and put into action the mission command principles that lead to successful mission completion at chipyong-ni. This battle was truly a major turning point for the U.S. and changed the way we fought future battles.